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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model of the ﬁrm size distribution. Empirical studies of the ﬁrm size
distribution often compare the moments to a log-normal distribution as implied by Gibrat’s Law and note
important deviations. Thus, the ﬁrst, and basic questions we ask are how well does the dynamic industry
model reproduce Gibrat’s Law and how well does it match the deviations uncovered in the literature. We
show that the model reproduces these results when testing the simulated output using the techniques of
the empirical literature. We then use the model to study how structural parameters aﬀect the ﬁrm size
distribution. We ﬁnd that, among other things, ﬁxed and sunk costs increase both the mean and variance
of the ﬁrm size distribution while generally decreasing the skewness and kurtosis. The rate of growth in
an industry also raises the mean and variance, but has non-monotonic eﬀects on the higher moments.
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Studies on the ﬁrm size distribution and Gibrat’s Law to date have been the province of empiricists.
We can write down various reduced form models, as in McCloughan (1995), to reproduce many
of the statistical facts surrounding the ﬁrm size distribution and Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate
Eﬀect which states that the growth rate of a ﬁrm is independent of its size. However, little of
the empirical work has been guided by a formal structural model. In Caves’ (1998) survey on
the recent empirical ﬁndings in industrial organization, he states, “Although the importance of
these facts for economic behavior and performance is manifest, their development has not been
theory-driven.” This paper seeks to take a step towards ﬁlling this gap.
We employ an extension of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model of a dynamic industry that
allows for ﬁrm growth developed by Laincz (2004a). By varying key priors, the simulations
demonstrate potential sources for the various, and sometimes conﬂicting, results on Gibrat’s Law
uncovered in the empirical literature. We demonstrate that the model matches empirical ﬁndings
on Gibrat’s Law.
A more recent literature uncovers signiﬁcant cross-industry variation in the higher moments
of the ﬁrm size distribution. Machado and Mata (2000) ﬁnd that industry characteristics such
as technological orientation and capital-intensity are signiﬁcantly related to the skewness. Lotti
and Santerelli (2004) show how the distribution of a new cohorts diﬀers across diﬀerent industries
and over time. Audretsch et al. (2004) present evidence suggesting that the ﬁrm size distribution
of the service industry diﬀers from manufacturing. We use the model to develop theoretical
reasoning for many of these ﬁndings, however, our analysis also emphasizes that some variables
have strong non-monotonic eﬀects on the moments of the ﬁrm size distribution suggesting caution
in generalizing empirical results based on linear speciﬁcations.
After brieﬂy reviewing the lengthy empirical literature on Gibrat’s Law and its relationship to
the ﬁrm size distribution in the next section, section 3 presents the basic model. In section 4 we
1compare the results of a baseline simulation to the empirical literature on the ﬁrm size distribution
and Gibrat’s Law. Section 5 then documents how varying key structural parameters alters the
ﬁrm size distribution. Section 6 summarizes the results.
2 Gibrat’s Law and Empirical Findings
Following the seminal works of Hart and Prais (1956) and Ijiri and Simon (1964), the industrial
organization literature devoted much energy into exploring the statistical regularity known as
Gibrat’s Law as it applies to the ﬁrm size distribution. Figure 1 shows the size distribution of
enterprises for the U.S. in 2001. Notably, the distribution is signiﬁcantly skewed to the right
with the large peak for the smallest size class with non-zero employment. The following simple
statistical process generates almost the same distribution. Let xi b et h es i z eo fﬁrm i,t h e ng r o w t h
from one period to the next is represented as:
xi(t)=x
β
i (t − 1)exp[ui(t)], β>0 (1)
where ui(t) v iid N(µ,σ2).D e ﬁning yi(t)=l nxi(t), then:
yi(t)=βyi(t − 1) + ui(t). (2)
When β =1we have Gibrat’s Law wherein the growth rate of a ﬁrm is independent of its size
and the process yields a log-normal distribution of ﬁrm sizes. Empirical work on the ﬁrm size
distribution ﬁnds that this characterization is a close, but imperfect proxy for the data. The
earliest work on Gibrat’s Law only had data available for large ﬁrms. Hart and Prais (1956), for
example, included only ﬁrms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1885 and 1950. They
found that Gibrat’s Law provided a good statistical approximation for the distribution. Simon
and Bonini (1958) found similar results for large US ﬁrms.
More recently, Hart and Oulton (1996) compare the implications of (1) to a large sample of
ﬁrms measured by employees, net sales, and net assets. They ﬁnd that the distribution has a
2long right tail, with skewness coeﬃcient estimates ranging from 0.19 to 0.75, and leptokurtic with
values from 4.58 to 6.20. However, they argue the deviations should not be compared with the
extreme of matching the log-normal distribution exactly and that the close approximation justiﬁes
the use of Gibrat’s Law in empirical work.
Our task is rather diﬀerent. We are speciﬁcally interested in the deviations themselves. We
want to construct a sensible model of optimizing ﬁrm behavior that can both approximate the
distribution and provide us with a tool to understand the deviations and, moreover, cross-industry
diﬀerences. Before turning to the model, we look at the literature that explicitly rejects the strong
form of Gibrat’s Law where β is exactly one.
Mansﬁeld (1962) was perhaps the ﬁrst to explicitly deal with the problems that entry and
exit present for the interpretation of Gibrat’s Law. Speciﬁcally, since exiting ﬁrms eﬀectively
have a growth rate of -100%, does Gibrat’s Law hold for all ﬁrms, only the survivors, or for ﬁrms
exceeding a size threshold such as minimum eﬃcient scale? Of the three, he found that the latter
interpretation ﬁth i sd a t at h eb e s tu s i n gaχ2 test on the lognormality of the distributions for
each of his industries in each time perio d . I ng r o w t hs i z er e g r e s s i o n s ,M a n s ﬁeld found that in the
entire sample of survivors, ﬁrms grow less than proportionally, i.e. β<1. However, analyzing
large ﬁrms only, he found that the mean growth rate is independent of size, i.e. β =1 . He still
concluded that Gibrat’s law does not hold for any of the versions considered due to the fact that,
even for the case of larger ﬁrms only, the variance of growth rates decreases with size.
Subsequent empirical analysis largely conﬁrmed Mansﬁeld’s initial foray into the subject. Us-
ing more advanced econometric techniques to deal with heteroscedasticity and sample selection
bias, Hall (1987) and Evans (1987) found that Gibrat’s Law generally holds for large ﬁrms, but
not for the entire population. They uncover a negative relationship between size and growth.
Dunne and Hughes (1994) also ﬁnd that while size evolves proportionally for medium and large
ﬁrms, small ﬁrms’ growth rates have higher variance and tend to decrease with size.
Another set of growth regression studies focused on the persistence of deviations of ﬁrm size
3from the mean, which would imply biased estimates for β. Singh and Whittington (1975) and
Kumar (1985) found evidence for serial correlation in the growth rates of ﬁrms supporting the
variant of Gibrat’s Law proposed in Ijiri and Simon (1964). Kumar (1985) conﬁrms the previous
ﬁndings rejecting the strong form of Gibrat’s Law, by showing that the earlier conclusions were
robust to correcting for autocorrelation in the growth rates.
One of the problems that has plagued this literature, particularly the early work by Hart and
Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini (1958), has been data without a balanced representation of
small ﬁrms. Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Hart and Oulton’s (1996) work tries to address the
problem by using a database with broad representation of small ﬁrms. They use this database
to test for diﬀerences in growth rates among ﬁrms of diﬀerent size classes and ﬁnd the diﬀerences
to be signiﬁcant in contrast to Gibrat’s Law. In the analysis of our model, we ﬁnd the same
diﬀerences and we also note that how small ﬁrms are counted matters when analyzing the ﬁrm
size distribution itself.
A newer literature focusses on cross-industry variation. Santarelli and Lotti (2004) look at
the evolution of the size distribution of new ﬁrms in four industries. Over a period of ﬁve years
most of the distributions approach the log normal distribution, however, they ﬁnd that the more
technologically oriented industries achieved the lognormal faster. Audretsch et al. (2004) ﬁnd
evidence that services may exhibit diﬀerent distributional properties than manufacturing, the
main focus of the empirical literature to date. Looking at the Dutch hospitality sector they ﬁnd
that growth is independent of size, whereas the majority of studies focusing on manufacturing
ﬁnd the negative growth-size relation discussed above. Machado and Mata (2000) use quantile
regressions to examine the eﬀect of industry characteristics on diﬀerent portions of the distribution
for Portuguese data. While their results are mixed for some characteristics and distribution
measures, they ﬁnd that the impact of industry characteristics on skewness is the most stable over
time. Both technology measures and the rate of growth in an industry reduce the skewness of the
distribution, while turbulence increases it.
4However, all of the results of the previous paragraph lack a solid theoretical base for their
ﬁndings. It is this gap in the literature we seek to ﬁll by proposing a fully dynamic model of
optimizing ﬁrms that generates the distributional characteristics found in the empirical literature.
3T h e M o d e l
To capture the forces that aﬀect ﬁrm size distribution in a structural model, we apply a
variant of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model described in Laincz (2004a). The modiﬁcation
allows for continually falling marginal costs through process R&D such that we can discuss both
ﬁrm and industry growth rates. That enables us to perform analogous growth-size tests on the
resulting simulated data.
We specify an industry with a ﬁnite set of imperfect substitutes such that one of the common
drawbacks of the Ericson-Pakes framework does not apply. Because the state space for a single
industry can be very large, it limits the total number of ﬁrms that the computational algorithm can
handle, often to no more than about 10 ﬁrms. In order to generate a cross-sectional distribution
with a reasonable number of observations, our industry is characterized by a ﬁnite set of imperfect
substitutes, but each good is produced by a Cournot oligopoly. We solve for the dynamics
associated with each substitute separately treating them as highly disaggregated goods and then
aggregate across the varieties. We think of each good as being deﬁned at a 7-digit level in the
SIC or NAIC codes, for example, and the aggregation taking place at a less detailed industry level
such as 4 or 5 digits.1
By specifying independent products within the same broader market, we bridge the literature
between the earlier stochastic models and the more recent literature devoted to strategic inter-
action. The older literature presumed that a market contained a series of isolated opportunities
and assigned exogenous probabilities that these opportunities would be undertaken by either in-
1 The approach is similar to Sutton (1998), pgs. 19-20. However, our use of the term “submarkets” diﬀers from
his and accords more with his notion of “subindustry” (see pages 297-298).
5cumbents or new entrants. As Sutton (1997) states, the assumption is “crude,” however, “. .
. most conventionally deﬁned industries exhibit both some strategic interdependence within sub-
markets, and some degree of independence across submarkets.”2 Our characterization allows for
strategic interdependence within each product market, but independence across products within
the industry.
3.1 The Industry
We characterize the industry as producing intermediate goods sold into a perfectly competitive
ﬁnal goods sector. Firms producing the intermediate goods choose quantity produced, investment
in R&D, and whether to exit or not, if they are currently active in the product market, or enter
if they are not currently active. The dynamic equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium
which imposes that decisions are functions only of the current state which is the current market
structure. The basic timing of the model begins with incumbent ﬁrms ﬁrst choosing whether to
exit or not. The remaining incumbent ﬁrms then compete in a Cournot fashion in the product
market and determine their optimal levels of investment in R&D to lower future costs which follows
a stochastic process. Potential entrants then compare their opportunity cost of remaining outside
the industry to the expected value of entering in the next period. These potential entrants draw
on a public stock of knowledge which increases overtime through spillovers according to another
stochastic process. At the end of the period, R&D outcomes and the public stock of knowledge
for the next period are determined by the results of the stochastic processes.
3.1.1 The Product Markets
Demand for intermediate goods comes from a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector with a CRS
production function.3 Output in period t, Yt,o ft h eﬁnal goods sector is given by the production
2 Sutton (1997), p. 49.
3 We could analagously think of (3) as the utility function for a consumer and apply the framework to imperfectly








θm =1 . (3)
Each kmt is the input from subsector m,w h e r em denotes the products within the industry.
Within each subsector, multiple ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition providing a homogenous
good to gain market share. Normalizing the price of the ﬁnal good to unity, the demand for each





Firms producing intermediate goods at any given time have a technology for production of
intermediate goods where the marginal costs are constant although they vary across ﬁrms. All
ﬁrms are assumed to face constant ﬁxed costs which do not vary either with time or across ﬁrms.











qjm − MCjmqjm − f (5)
where market size, θmY , and total quantity,
PNm
n=1 qnm, determine the price of the intermediate
good, Pm. qjm is the quantity output of ﬁrm j producing product m, MCjm are the marginal
costs for ﬁrm j,a n df is ﬁxed costs. The implicit production function is linear in the input good
with a coeﬃcient equal to the inverse of the marginal cost.
We focus on one submarket to illustrate the model in the discussion that follows. Let N∗
m
be the number of ﬁrms producing qnm > 0. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes yield the
proﬁts for ﬁrm j as
π∗
jm =m a x
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⎠ ≥ 0. (7)
Equation (7) simply states that a ﬁrm will choose not to produce if its marginal costs are too high
relative to its competitors. The choice of produce or not to produce (also exit or not exit) is
assumed made prior to quantity decisions and all ﬁrms know the decisions of their rivals to ensure
uniqueness of the solution.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation generates a Cournot solution for the intermediate goods ﬁrms
in which proﬁts are homogenous of degree zero in the vector of marginal costs across ﬁrms. Thus, a
proportional change in the vector of marginal costs leaves proﬁts the same despite falling marginal
costs through process innovation (described below). Moreover, it allows for continuously declining
marginal costs as opposed to the Ericson-Pakes framework where marginal costs are restricted to
take on values in a ﬁnite set. The reason is that for any given vector of marginal costs, once the
policy functions specifying R&D expenditures, entry, and exit are determined, these decisions will
not vary provided the vector of marginal costs changes proportionally. Hence, policy functions
for a ﬁnite subset of possible vectors of marginal costs are suﬃcient to characterize the long-run
equilibrium as marginal costs continuously decline with process innovation.
However, the functional form of the demand system does create a problem in the case of
an intermediate goods industry containing a monopolist. Because the price elasticity of market
demand is unity, the monopolist’s solution is not well deﬁned. We assume that there is a minimum
scale level of operations for a monopoly.4 Let q be the minimum amount that a monopoly must
produce in order to engage in the market. The assumption has two eﬀects. First, it immediately
deﬁnes a solution for the monopoly problem with a positive level of output while still providing
4 There are other assumptions that could be made here instead, but do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. For
example, it would be more natural to think of the minimum scale assumption applying to all ﬁrms whether or
not there is a monopoly. This assumption, while more plausible, only complicates the Cournot-Nash solution by
changing the corner solution for output from 0 to q for aﬀected ﬁrms. Moreover, Dixit-Stiglitz technology is a
viable alternative that yields the same homogeneity of degree zero property, but it does not create a poorly deﬁned
monopoly problem as in Laincz (2004b). That extension introduces a more complicated problem to solve without
adding much in the way of additional insights for the present inquiry.
8the monopoly with incentives to invest in order to lower its costs. Furthermore, provided q is
suﬃciently small, there remain strong incentives for ﬁrms to strive to become monopolists. The
minimum scale chosen for the simulations of the next section, while small enough to generate large
monopoly proﬁts, is such that in equilibrium ﬁr m sa l w a y sh a v es u ﬃciently strong incentives to
remain in the market or enter the market when the number of ﬁrms is small. Those incentives
are discussed in the next subsection. Given that true monopolies without regulatory protection
are exceedingly rare, the focus on markets where the probability of a monopoly emerging is quite
small seems realistic and appropriate for the questions at hand regarding the distribution of ﬁrms.
3.1.2 Evolution of Market Structure
The number of ﬁrms operating in each product market and their relative levels of marginal cost
determine the market structure at any point in time. The market structure evolves through
process R&D which lowers a ﬁrm’s marginal cost when R&D is successful. We track the level
of marginal costs by accounting for the number of innovations that each ﬁrm j in market m has





Marginal costs fall at the rate η with each additional innovation. Z is a scale parameter on costs
which we use below to calibrate the model to match the mean employment level of ﬁrms observed
in the data. Z captures the unit labor costs of ﬁrms relative to the price of the ﬁnal output
good. Firms with a greater number of innovations enjoy a cost advantage over rivals. The cost
advantage generates higher proﬁts and the motive for engaging in process R&D.
The total number of innovations accessible by ﬁrm j is the sum of publicly available innovations
for product m, labelled Imt,a n de a c hﬁrm’s private innovations, ipjmt,
ijmt = Imt + ipjmt. (9)
Private innovations of incumbents diﬀuse to the public stock at a constant rate, δ.T h u s , Imt
9increments by one with probability δ in every period. We interpret δ as the strength of lead-time,
secrecy, and patent protection within the industry. However, for incumbent ﬁrms an increment in
the stock of public innovations also means a reduction in the stock of private innovations. Thus,
in the absence of successful R&D in any period (discussed below), diﬀu s i o no fa ni n n o v a t i o nt o
the public stock leaves the total stock of innovations for an incumbent unchanged. In section 5,
w ee x p l o r eh o wt h ed i ﬀusion rate, δ, alters the observed ﬁrm size distribution.
The constantly growing public stock of innovations allows potential entrants to remain viable.5
Completely new ﬁrms in a particular market do not have to invest to learn all of the innovations
that have taken place in an industry since the beginning of time. Rather, we assume that most
innovations are in the form of readily available public knowledge, while more recent innovations
are held privately by incumbent ﬁrms. Existing ﬁrms have access to all of the publicly available
technological innovations and have discovered some new ones through process R&D which is
temporarily private information. It is through this process of knowledge diﬀusion that industries
are prevented from becoming permanently monopolized.6
We assume that new ﬁrms generally enter at relatively lower eﬃciency levels than incumbents
to capture the fact that hazard rates of exit decline with the age of the ﬁrm (See Dunne, Robertson,
and Samuelson, 1988). Speciﬁcally, new ﬁrms will enter, on average, with fewer private innovations
than incumbents:











where ipEN represents the number of private innovations of a new entrant. If new ﬁrms entered
5 If all information was permanently private, a leading ﬁrm could innovate a suﬃcient number of times such
that the cost to a new ﬁrm of acquiring enough innovations to generate positive proﬁts would make entry costs
prohibitively high.
6 In the speciﬁcation presented here, there are no spillovers between active ﬁrms which contrasts with the
empirical evidence (e.g. Griliches, 1998). The spillover from private to the public stock of knowledge is necessary
for continual growth because it enables new ﬁrms to enter at levels competitive with incumbents. The model can
be adjusted to account for diﬀusion between incumbent ﬁrms. Doing so would enable analysis of the role of secrecy
and lead time and how they interact with market structure. Overall, we do not believe it would change the main
results presented in the next section, but we do believe it is worthy of exploration in future work.
10at higher levels than incumbents, then incumbents would be more likely to die than entrants
producing the counterfactual result that incumbents have a higher hazard rate of exit than new
ﬁrms. The left side of the inequality implies that new ﬁrms are bringing some new ideas while the
right-side, e ip, is the equilibrium average (over the long-run) number of private innovations held by
incumbent ﬁrms. This assumption then creates the possibility that new ﬁrms can immediately
establish themselves as the new leader if incumbents repeatedly fail to innovate.7
The stock of private innovations held by incumbent ﬁrm j increases through successful R&D.
T h er o l eo fR & Di sg i v e nb y :







1+axjmt, for υjmt =1
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xjmt is the level of R&D undertaken by a ﬁrm at time t. Note that the function does not vary with
ﬁrm size, i.e. large ﬁrms do not possess an inherent advantage in successfully conducting R&D.
We do not need to assume advantages owing to size to generate R&D spending distributions
that match the highly skewed distributions in the data (see Laincz 2004a). This assumption
is consistent with the arguments of Cohen and Klepper (1992) among others that there are no
diﬀerences in the productivity of research investment owing to ﬁrm size.
The parameter a governs the productivity of R&D and is interpreted as measuring the tech-
nological opportunity and basic state of science. We assume this to be constant across ﬁrms and
product markets. Clearly, the level of R&D productivity will be an important parameter for
v a r i a t i o ni nt h eﬁrm size distribution. Higher levels of a generate greater potential for any one
7 This outcome occurs only rarely. Most of the time new ﬁrms will enter with a small market share relative to
existing incumbents.
11ﬁrm to extend its technological advantage and generate greater variance in ﬁrm sizes. We explore
the relationship between technological opportunity and the ﬁrm size distribution in section 5.
The combination of the two stochastic variables, R&D and diﬀusion, in conjunction with the
solution to the dynamic equilibrium results in an upper bound on how much of a lead ﬁrms
will actually gain over potentially new ﬁrms in equilibrium. Because returns to investment are
decreasing when marginal costs are relatively low, ﬁrms will enter a “coasting” state and choose
not to invest because the gains eventually become outweighed by the costs.8
This speciﬁcation for the evolution of marginal costs and innovation has several notable fea-
tures. First, it is the relative marginal costs that matter to ﬁrms’ proﬁt sa ss h o w ni n( 6 ) ;t h e
absolute level of the marginal costs (or total stock of innovations) is irrelevant to the decisions of
a ﬁrm. Second, in contrast to Ericson-Pakes, the spillover process does not change the marginal
costs of active ﬁrms, but it does lower the costs of potential entrants because the stock of pub-
licly available innovations continually grows. This feature allows for potential entrants to remain
within striking distance of the incumbents. Hence, the contribution of private innovations to the
public stock is an externality that beneﬁts the pool of potential entrants.
3.1.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
Let snm be the number of ﬁrms with ip private innovations producing product m and deﬁne the
vector sm =[ snm] which describes the market structure at any point in time. There are two
types of ﬁrms facing diﬀerent problems: incumbents and potential entrants. Incumbents are
either producing for the market or choosing to exit. Their problem is characterized by comparing
the expected net present value of investment in R&D against a positive liquidation value given by
φ. Potential entrants compare an outside alternative, ψ, against the net present value of entering
minus sunk costs of establishing production facilities denoted by χ.B o t h φ and χ are assumed
constant across time and equal across ﬁrms.
8 See Ericson and Pakes (1995) for a discussion of the coasting states.
12An incumbent’s intertemporal decision can be described by the following Bellman equation
where time subscripts are replaced with a prime indicating a future value and all others are
current:
V I
jm(ipjm,s m)=m a x
½












where the I superscript refers to the value of an incumbent. If the ﬁrm chooses to exit it receives
the liquidation value φ,o t h e r w i s et h eﬁrm receives current period proﬁts minus its investment
level in R&D, xjm at a cost of c per unit plus the discounted expected value conditional on future
market structure. The future market structure depends on the ﬁrm’s current number of private
innovations and the current market structure. 1/(1 + r) is the common discount factor facing
all ﬁrms. The expectation sign reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrm is assigning probability weights via
the transition matrix of the market structure moving from its current state to all possible states.
These include the probability of a spillover, the probability the ﬁrm itself will be successful in
R&D, the probabilities of other ﬁrms being successful, and the probabilities of entry and exit.
A potential entrepreneur may enter a submarket, incur sunk entry costs, and establish pro-
duction and R&D facilities. Production and sales do not begin until the following period. The
Bellman equation resembles that for incumbents with few changes:
V EN
jm (ipEN,s m)=m a x
½










where the EN superscript refers to entrants and the future value corresponds to that of being an
incumbent in the next period. ψ measures the opportunity cost of entering and χ represents the
sunk entry costs. By endogenizing entry and exit, we can observe how turnover rates respond
to changes in structural parameters as we observe changes in the ﬁrm size distribution in the
analytical section of the paper.
The investment strategy of ﬁrms derives from the ﬁrst order conditions on the above. Let
C1(ip0
jm +1 ,s 0
m) denote the expected value of the ﬁrm conditional on successful innovation and
C2(ip0
jm,s 0
m) the expected value if it fails to innovate. We can then rewrite the Bellman equation
13for incumbents as:
V I





















From this, the ﬁrst-order condition yields the following policy function:














The ﬁrm chooses the value maximizing level of R&D investment subject to a non-negativity
constraint on R&D expenditure. Investment in R&D rises with the expected marginal gain in
value, C1−C2, and falls with the discount rate, r, and the cost of investment, c. The productivity
of R&D, captured by a,h a so ﬀsetting eﬀects. As a rises it increases the probability of successful
R&D and an incentive to increase investment. However, the higher the level of a the lower the
marginal product for any given level of investment which lowers R&D investment.
Overall, the industry exhibits growth in total output and thus, Y in equation (1), grows over
time while the innovations constantly reduce the cost of inputs. This continually growing industry
can exhibit a great deal of change over time in terms of the identities of ﬁrms, their relative sizes,
and the degree of entry and exit. The model provides us with the ability to generate a long-run
ﬁrm size distribution based on the ergodic distribution of the model and the ability to examine
the growth-size relationship at the individual ﬁrm level. The numerical algorithm uses value
function iteration to solve for the space of values given by all possible combinations of ﬁrms and
private innovations. We extract the policy functions including R&D expenditure as well as the
entry and exit decisions. From the solutions, we can simulate our product markets and industry
for comparison with the results found in the empirical literature. We now turn to that analysis.
4 Firm Size Distribution
4.1 Simulation
Table 1 presents the baseline parameterization of the model. We set the discount rate to 1/1.08
as an approximation of the average cost of capital for ﬁrms following Ericson and Pakes (1995).
14The rate of technological spillovers, δ, is set to 0.7 such that knowledge enters the public pool
roughly one-and-a-half years after discovery. This ﬁts with the empirical estimates of Mansﬁeld
(1981) on imitation time. Cost of a unit of R&D spending is set to one unit of the ﬁnal good.
The liquidation value and outside opportunity cost are chosen to be small to prevent them from
dominating the incentives ﬁrms face. The liquidation value is about 7.5% of the average ﬁrm
value, while the opportunity cost is roughly 15% of average ﬁrm value. We set both ﬁxed and
sunk costs equal to the outside opportunity cost.
The parameters a and η interact to determine the incentives for investment in R&D and
ultimately the growth rate of the industry as measured by the rate of cost reduction. These
parameters are set to 3 and 10% respectively. The latter implies that successful R&D will reduce
marginal costs by 10%, but the former governs the incentives to engage in R&D such that we
ﬁnd at the mean level of R&D investment, the expected rate of cost reduction is just over 2%,
which is approximately the industry growth rate. Both of these two parameters, plus the rate
of knowledge diﬀusion, ﬁxed and sunk costs will be allowed to vary in the following section to
analyze their relationship to the moments of the ﬁrm size distribution.
T h es t a t es p a c ec o n s t r a i n t sw eu s eh a v eam a x i m u mo fs i xﬁrms per submarket and each ﬁrm
can hold up to 30 private innovations. To ensure that the state space boundaries do not drive the
results we choose our demand parameters such that when six symmetric ﬁrms are in a submarket
they are making negative proﬁts. For the maximum number of private innovations, we checked
in the simulations whether any ﬁrm attempted to obtain more private innovations than exist in
the state space and made adjustments accordingly which led to our choice of 30.
Because we had no priors on how to vary the submarket sizes, we choose to use a simple,
transparent linear function as follows:
θm = θ1 +( m − 1)b (17)
15where θ1 is the market share of the smallest submarket and each submarket increments by b.9
Upon simulating the model, we use the state space constraints to determine θ1 and determine m




The choices on the market size parameters, θ1 and b, were determined as follows. We started
with 10 submarkets, m =1 0 ,w h e r et h es m a l l e s tm a r k e ts h a r ew a sd e t e r m i n e db yt h el o w e s t
level of the market size that still produced positive levels of investment in R&D. At the tenth
submarket ﬁrms began to invest at the upper bound of the state space. Therefore the increments
in market share per submarket were determined to be 0.0318. For the analysis below, we then
choose the number of submarkets, m, to analyze by matching the general shape of the log-normal
distribution which closely, but not perfectly, resembles the empirical ﬁrm size distribution across
industries. We found that if there are too few markets, the distribution is skewed left instead
of right. Thus, for very narrowly deﬁned markets with only one or two submarkets, the model
generates a high frequency of average sized ﬁrms and a small number of tiny ﬁrms. On the
other hand, as the number of submarkets expanded the model generated a bimodal distribution,
in accord with some of the ﬁndings in Bottazi et. al. (2003b) for some industries. For the
general log-normal distribution, we found that specifying ﬁve submarkets, m =5 ,w a st h ec l o s e s t
match to the results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996) discussed in the next subsection. As a
further check on the validity of the results, beyond matching the general pattern of the ﬁrm size
distribution, we then conduct cross-sectional regressions to see if the growth-size relations match
the empirical literature in section 4.3.10
9 This speciﬁcation is similar to Sutton (1998) Chapter 13 where he uses a geometric distribution of market
sizes. We also considered using a random process, or possibly demand shocks, but opted for the simple linear
function on account of its transparency.
10 Clearly, it would be more appealing to have the submarket sizes determined endogenously. This additional
feature could perhaps be accomplished by specifying a Dixit-Stiglitz demand function. However, it would still
require additional assumptions on how ﬁrms interact across sectors in terms of both price-taking (or not) behavior
as well as specifying how innovations in one sector aﬀect the other. The additional complications introduced
w o u l dd e t r a c tf r o mt h em a i nt a s ko ft h i sp a p e r ,w h i c hi st ou n d e r s t a n dh o wt h eo v e r a l lﬁrm size distribution
changes with underlying structural parameters. Moreover, because our model captures strategic interaction within
each submarket, it is likely that most forms of strategic interaction across submarkets would be of second order
164.2 Distribution Results
In our ﬁrst comparison of the model with the data, we compute the ergodic distribution by
simulating the model.11 From the distribution found in the simulations, we weight the observed
outcomes by their probability of occurrence to generate the ergodic distributions for various size
measures.12
Table 2 shows the results of the baseline parameterization compared with the statistics found
in Hart and Oulton (1996) who use subsets (50 to 80 thousand companies) of a large UK database
that includes very small ﬁrms in the sample. We calibrate the cost parameter, Z,t om a t c ht h e
mean log size of employment reported in Hart and Oulton (1996). Because their data set has a
good representation of small ﬁrms we felt that it was the most appropriate for comparison with
the model. They ﬁnd that the distribution of the natural log of various size measures (employ-
ment, sales, and net assets) exhibit positive skewness (long right-tails) and peaked (leptokurtic)
distributions relative to the log normal distribution. We report analogous measures based on our
model.13 Sales are computed by extracting the quantities and prices while we use ﬁrm values,
V I, for net assets. All values below are reported in natural logs.
Figures 2-4 show the distributions in levels (a) and in logs (b). The distributions in levels,
for all the three size proxies considered, exhibit long right tails, especially for the net assets
distribution. The size range accumulating the higher probability mass lies to the left of the
mean size in all the distributions. The distributions for both the log of sales and log of net assets
are roughly bell shaped, but exhibit thicker tails and higher peaks than the standard normal.
importance. Our assumption of no strategic interaction across submarkets ﬁts with the arguments of Sutton
(1997), mentioned earlier, for blending strategic interaction with the independent opportunities assumed in the
older literature on Gibrat’s Law.
11 The simulation runs the model for one million periods. In order to avoid any bias caused by the speciﬁcation
of the initial market structure, we simulate it ﬁrst for 10,000 periods and ﬁnd the modal market structure. The
main simulation then uses the modal market structure as its starting point.
12 It is important to note that the comparison here with the data is not direct. We take advantage of the fact
that through simulations we can generate the probability distribution of the market structures. Empirical studies
use a cross-section of ﬁrms at a point in time (we turn to this analysis later) while the ergodic distribution shows
the probabilities of a market structure occurring at a point in time. That is, the ergodic distribution is generated
as a time series, but it reveals what the expected cross-section would look like.
13 All employment calculations add one in levels to represent the manager which we view as part of ﬁxed costs.
17The distribution of the log of employment exhibi t sl e s sv a r i a n c e ,b u ts h o w ss o m es k e w n e s sa n d
leptokurtosis.
There are two noticeable diﬀerences between the model and the data. First, the standard
deviations of the size measures are considerably smaller. This discrepancy is not surprising since
the model is designed for a particular industry whereas the empirical estimates cover a large range
of industries which would generate greater size variation.
Of greater concern is the slight negative skewness in the natural log of employment generated
by the model versus the positive skewness observed in the data. Upon careful examination of
the results, it turns out that the negative skewness is being driven by a tiny fraction of extremely
small ﬁrms. These are ﬁrms with less than one employee which constitute about 0.1% of all
ﬁrms and only 0.0025% of total employment. Those ﬁrms are to the right of the vertical line in
Figures 2a and 2b. If we eliminate them from the distribution and recalibrate Z, the skewness
in employment goes slightly positive and the negative skewness in sales is cut in half as shown
in Table 3. Moreover, the high kurtosis value in sales comes down considerably and is much
more in line with the data. If we drop more small ﬁrms, less than 5 employees (0.02% of total
employment), the skewness for employment rises to approximately 0.41. In fact, we found that
we can match the Hart and Oulton skewness ﬁgure almost exactly if we eliminate all ﬁrms of less
than 10 employees (0.14% of total employment).
The negative skewness for sales remains even after eliminating the small ﬁrms, although the
skewness value for sales reported by Hart and Oulton, while positive, is the smallest of the three.
This result of our model is being driven by the strong implications of Cournot oligopoly pricing
with homogenous goods in each submarket. For example, when multiple ﬁrms produce large
quantities, and hence have substantial employment, the direct competition between them drives
the price down signiﬁcantly. What we ﬁnd is that the model often generates 3 or 4 ﬁrms in a
given submarket with marginal costs that are very close. Although quantities are reasonably
high for these ﬁrms, the low level of the price accounts for the reduced skewness when comparing
18employment and sales.14 Overall, the ergodic distribution of the model reasonably matches the
observed data in terms of deviations from a log-normal distribution
When we turn to the growth-size relationship in the next subsection, we extract a balanced
panel which eliminates exiting ﬁrms. These exiting ﬁrms include these extremely small ﬁrms
that generate the negative skewness in employment. Thus, in our summary statistics on the
balanced panel below, the skewness measures increase signiﬁcantly. These results suggest an
interesting hypothesis. First, although the skewness is generally smaller than that observed in
the data, it is important to bear in mind that data sets rarely include the full population of small
ﬁrms. Second, the model accounts, in some sense, for part-time workers while data typically
do not. These diﬀerences may be relevant empirically for testing distributions against the log-
normal distribution. For example, if data collected round workers upward it would imply an
underweighting of the left-side of the distribution which would bias skewness upwards.
4.3 Cross-Sectional Growth-Size Properties
We examine the growth-size relationships of the simulated model and compare them with the
empirical literature on Gibrat’s Law. To extract cross-sectional data comparable to that used in
the empirical literature, we simulate the model ﬁve times for 5,000 periods each and extract the
ﬁnal periods from each run.15 That provides us with simulated panel data to test the growth-size
relationship. We ran these simulations ten times to check the robustness of these results.
The average number of total ﬁrms observed in each simulation was 138.8 (range of 132 to 143)
with an average of 43.4 new entries over two periods and 25.9 exits.16 We eliminate all the new
entrants, who do not produce in their initial period and all ﬁrms that exit to generate a balanced
panel for analysis. Table 4 shows the average distributional characteristics for size measures
14 Note that the statistics we report exclude monopolies altogether so as not to be aﬀected by the minimum
quantity assumption. In the baseline, monopolies account for less than 0.000001% of all observations.
15 To prevent the variance of the size of the ﬁrms from being dominated by the overall growth process, we shut
down the increments to the public stock of knowledge except for the periods we extracted for analysis.
16 Note that entries and exits would match almost exactly if we included those ﬁrms that exited in the previous
period.
19across these simulations of the balanced panel of ﬁrms for the initial period. The measures are
similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 3, but note the substantial increases in the skewness values
when small exiting ﬁrms are eliminated.17
Table 5 provides the results of the regressions on each of the ten simulations of the following
form:
yt = βyt−1 +  t
where yt is the log of the various size measures. Of interest in terms of Gibrat’s Law is whether
the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. Hall’s (1987) estimates for β as applied to
employment across three diﬀerent samples were consistently 0.99 and signiﬁcantly less than one.
Evans (1987) found values for β that range between 0.93 and 0.97 for employment. The model
here also generates a coeﬃcient less than one, below Hall’s estimates, but in accord with those
of Evans’.18 The last columns report the percentage of times the null hypothesis of β =1was
rejected at the 10% level, followed by the percentage of times it was rejected at the 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
We use the median size values to split our sample into large and small ﬁrms. Empirical
evidence suggests that Gibrat’s Law works better for the large ﬁrms. Our results show a similar
pattern. The estimated β’s are consistently closer to one for the large ﬁrm sample for each size
measure and in every simulated sample. In fact, for the employment size measure we cannot
reject β =1nine out of ten times and then only at the 10% level.
F o rt h et h r e es i z em e a s u r e sw ea l s ot e s t e df o rt h ee q u a l i t yo ft h ec o e ﬃcients between the large
and small ﬁrm subsets reported in the last rows of Table 5. For employment we reject equality in
all cases at the 5% level or better and 80% of the time at the 1% level. For sales, the diﬀerences
17 The negative skewness in sales persists, but becomes even smaller in absolute value than when we eliminated
the smallest ﬁrms outright in the preceding subsection.
18 We report the results using robust standard errors, but even without using them the results are hardly changed.
The R-squared’s are exceedingly high typically between 0.95 and 0.99. However, since there are only two simple
stochastic processes in the model and nothing akin to demand shocks, it is not surprising in the least that past size
is a good predictor of size in the short-run.
20weaken somewhat and we reject equality 60% of the time all of those t-statistics at the 5% level
or better. Equality of values is rejected in nearly all of the subsamples. It is worth emphasizing,
however, that in all subsamples, the estimated beta for large ﬁrms was greater than that of small
ﬁrms for all three size measures. Given the small sample size we draw, the large number of
signiﬁcant rejections of βLARGE = βSMALL, indicates the model matches the empirical ﬁndings.
In order to test for serial correlation we reduce our sample to those ﬁrms surviving in three
consecutive periods for a balanced panel. The previous tests only had 69.5 observations on average
and after one more period of eliminating exiting ﬁrms to retain a balanced panel, we were left on
average with 46.9 ﬁrms. The test speciﬁcation is similar to Kumar (1985) where growth is the











Persistence in growth will show up as a positive value for γ.W e ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for β
and γ are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the majority of the ten samples. Their average estimated
values are 0.9817 and 0.577 respectively. γ is positive and signiﬁcant in all but one of the samples
at the 1% level.
The positive and signiﬁcant value of γ indicates serial correlation which comes as no surprise
given the design of the model. There are several contributing factors to serial correlation in our
model. First, successful ﬁrms seek to build on and protect any technological advantage and thus
invest more heavily than small ﬁrms. In addition, a growing ﬁrm pushes rival ﬁrms closer to the
exit threshold. Thus, the growing ﬁrm will get a subsequent additional increase in market share
with the increase in the likelihood of rivals’ exit. These processes of ﬁrm dynamics eﬀectively
embed serial correlation in error terms that do not control for innovative behavior and expected
future changes in market share conditional on them. The results suggest that serial correlation
should weaken in empirical studies if appropriate controls for own and rival R&D expenditure and
21innovations are included. We leave this hypothesis for future empirical work.19
Finally, we look at the variance in growth rates across ﬁrm sizes. A number of the studies
ﬁnd that the variance of the growth rate is larger for small ﬁrms (e.g. Dunne and Hughes, 1994).
Again, we separate our simulated samples by the median size. Table 6 shows the average standard
deviations in growth rates across the ten samples and for large and small ﬁrms according to the
three size measures. By all three measures the variance in the growth rate of the small ﬁrms
is larger than that of the large ﬁrms and across all ten samples. The ﬁnal columns report the
percentage of rejections based on the F-statistic for the variance ratio test for equality of the
standard deviations. We reject equality at the 1% level based on the employment and sales
measures in seven out of ten samples, but in only half the samples for net assets. The latter also
has the highest level of the standard deviation. Overall, the results are encouraging in the sense
that, again the model replicates empirical ﬁndings.
To summarize the section, we ﬁnd that the model is able to replicate empirical studies of
Gibrat’s Law in two ways. First, it can generate a ﬁrm size distribution with the higher moments
deviating from the log-normal distribution in the same direction as actual distributions. Secondly,
in the cross-section the model generates a negative ﬁrm size-growth relationship, decreasing vari-
ance in the growth rate with ﬁrm size, and serial correlation, all found in the data. Based on the
above we feel reasonably conﬁdent in using the model to understand how underlying structural
parameters aﬀect the overall ﬁrm size distribution.
19 One note on the magnitude of serial correlation is required here. Our estimate of γ is larger than that found
in either Singh and Whittington (1975) or Kumar (1985) who ﬁnd values of approximately 0.3 and 0.l2 respectively.
The distinguishing feature is in the diﬀerence in time periods. Those authors use a much longer time frame, 10
to 12 years, compared with our simulated data which corresponds to roughly three years based on the user cost
of capital we specify. Because we know that the model will predict serial correlation that declines over time due
to the Markov perfect nature of the equilibrium, we do not pursue that issue any further here. Suﬃce it to say,
that the model does generate serial correlation in the errors when using the basic regression model found in the
growth-size regressions related to Gibrat’s Law. See Pakes and Ericson (1998) for the empirical implications of
the Markov Perfect feature embedded in the model.
225 Variation in the Firm Size Distribution
The previous section established that the model reasonably matches the data in terms of the
ﬁrm size distribution and in its cross-sectional empirics. Now we ask how the moments of the
ﬁrm size distribution change with underlying structural parameters suggested in the literature.
Speciﬁcally we vary the following parameters: sunk costs, ﬁxed costs, productivity of R&D, rate
of spillovers, and the rate of decline in marginal costs.20 The goal of this section is to generate
a set of hypotheses that can be examined empirically. We do not carry out that examination in
this paper, but view the contribution of this analysis as setting an empirical research agenda on
the ﬁrm size distribution guided by theory. How the model fares when taken to the data should
provide insights for improvement in the model itself and a deeper understanding of the empirical
work. All of the analysis below shows the distribution including all levels of employment, i.e. all
ﬁrms are included no matter how small.21 22
5.1 Fixed Costs
We start with ﬁxed and sunk costs. In the baseline ﬁxed costs were set to 0.2 and we allow that
to vary from 0 to 0.25, when translated via the unit cost of labor, the range of the ﬁxed costs
then go from about 12% (for the smallest non-zero value, 0.025) to just over 50% of total costs of
production excluding R&D costs for the mean sized ﬁrm in the sample.
We ﬁnd that increases in the level of ﬁxed costs lead to a larger mean size of ﬁrms, but lower
variance, skewness and kurtosis of the ﬁrm size distribution. Figure 5a shows how the ﬁrst four
20 We do not vary the outside alternative parameter, ψ, because it enters in much the same way as sunk costs,
a n dw ed on o tv a r yt h el i q u i d a t i o nv a l u eb e c a u s et h ep a r a m e t e rm u s tb ec o n s t r a i n e dt ob el e s st h a nXe/(1+r) such
that ﬁrms cannot enter, produce nothing, and exit with a net gain. We also do not vary the discount rate because
even if the discount factor varied uniformly across ﬁrms, such variations basically mean interest rate variations and
those variations are typically short-run ﬂuctuations rather than long-run characteristics inherent to an industry
that shape the ﬁrm size distribution.
21 We also examined the behavior of the ﬁrst four moments when eliminating small ﬁr m sa si nt h ep r e v i o u s
section, but found no qualitative diﬀerences. The only notable diﬀerence was that as we eliminated small ﬁrms
from those of less than 1 employee, to less than 5, to less than 10, the eﬀects became even more pronounced. By
that we mean that the percentage changes in any moment of the ﬁrm size distribution were larger when eliminating
small ﬁrms, but the direction of the eﬀects was stable.
22 We also analyzed the changes in the distributions of both sales and net assets, but we do not report those
results here. Qualitatively they are very similar to the eﬀects on the size distributions by employment.
23moments of the ﬁrm size distribution change relative to the baseline while Figure 5b shows the
same measures when we look at the ﬁrm size distribution in natural logs. The x-axis shows the
level of ﬁxed costs and the y-axis shows the percentage change from the baseline. Figure 5c shows
the baseline distribution in levels against the low and high value of ﬁxed costs.23 In the latter,
Figure 5c, low levels of ﬁxed costs are associated with a greater mass of the distribution at lower
levels of employment, but also with a longer right-tail and, hence, a higher skewness. The high
levels of the ﬁxed cost exhibit greater mass further to the right and there is a small, but noticeable,
second mode emerging to the right of the peak.
Figure 5d shows the same distribution but in natural logs and we see similar changes. The
mean size rises as the mass of small ﬁrms shrinks while the mass of larger ﬁrms grows. The variance
falls as the distribution becomes more leptokurtic (in logs) as ﬁrms become more concentrated
around the mean size. The skewness increases relative to the baseline at lower levels of the ﬁxed
costs, but then declines at the higher levels. The initial increase stems from an increase in the
frequency of ﬁrms above the mean size creating more mass on the right-side of the distribution.
The decrease follows from the ﬂattening of the left-side of the distribution as smaller ﬁrms become
more dispersed in their scale of operations.
When we set ﬁxed costs to zero, the mean ﬁrm size is more than 11% below the mean size
of ﬁrms in our baseline. As ﬁxed costs rise the mean size of ﬁrms also rises with a more rapid
increase at higher levels. Although the pattern exhibits some non-monotonicity, the variance
generally falls with increases in ﬁxed costs, while both skewness and kurtosis decline.
Intuitively, in the model higher ﬁxed costs make it more likely that small ﬁrms will choose not
to produce as in equation (7) and increase the likelihood of exit because future proﬁtv a l u e sa r e
smaller for the same level of output. Thus, by reducing the fraction of small ﬁrms in the sample
the mean size increases. Moreover, with small ﬁrms more likely to exit, higher ﬁxed costs create
23 In Figures 9 through 12 for the graphs showing the shape of the ﬁrm size distribution, we standardize the
x-axis to maximums of 160 and 6, in levels and logs. However, in many cases the maximum sized ﬁrm exceeds
those values. We choose to standardize the x-axis to facilitate comparison in the regions showing the bulk of the
mass and how the parameters alter the distribution.
24greater incentives to innovate for incumbent ﬁrms to distance themselves from the exit threshold
which further increases the mean. The variance, however, declines and is related to the decrease
in kurtosis. With a reduced fraction of small ﬁrms, the frequency of ﬁrms near the mean size
increases, but there is also an increase in the mass of ﬁrms to the right of the peak reﬂecting higher
R&D investment among incumbents which decreases the kurtosis. In natural logs we see more
or less the same pattern, however, the higher moments behave diﬀerently. Skewness displays an
inverted-U shaped pattern, while the kurtosis displays a generally increasing pattern. The reason
is that the fattening of the tails in levels is primarily just to the right of the primary mode such
that in logs the eﬀect blends with the original mode and the tails remain relatively ﬂat.
Skewness, in levels, falls because the region of small ﬁrms becomes smaller while the frequency
of mid-sized ﬁrms increases. This eﬀect ﬂattens and lengthens the tail on the left-side which
reduces the skewness. Thus, ﬁxed costs act in a way that is fairly straightforward by making it
more diﬃcult for very small ﬁrms to survive, essentially requiring a minimum scale of operations
to produce non-negative proﬁts and survive. These results are consistent with the ﬁndings of
Machado and Mata (2000) who use a Box-Cox quantile regression model to characterize the eﬀect
of covariates on the ﬁrm size distribution of Portuguese ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that minimum eﬃcient
scale had a consistently positive impact on the size of ﬁrms, a negative eﬀect on the skewness, and
an ambiguous eﬀect on kurtosis.24
5.2 Sunk Costs
Figures 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d show the results from varying the sunk costs of entry. The range here





Xe >ψcontinues to hold. The upper bound here is much higher
than for ﬁxed costs to capture industries for which sunk entry costs will take, in expectation,
signiﬁcant time to recover. These values can be understood as a ratio to the value of the mean
sized incumbent ﬁrm. The range is from 10% to 35% and equals approximately 21% at the
24 Machado and Mata (2000) do not report measures of variance.
25baseline. The vast majority of ﬁrms that enter the market do not recover their full sunk costs.
However, those that survive and grow ultimately reap substantial rewards. At low levels of
sunk costs, a ﬁrm does not need to survive for a long period of time before making entry optimal.
However, at high levels of the sunk costs, ﬁrms require a substantial likelihood of sustained success
to induce entry.
At low levels of the sunk costs we see little change in the mean size of ﬁrms, but a negative
eﬀect on all the higher moments. In fact, we ﬁnd that industries characterized by lower levels of
sunk and/or ﬁxed costs will more nearly match the log-normal distribution and the strong form of
Gibrat’s Law. In Figure 9c its clear that these changes are fairly small when comparing the shape
of the baseline distribution to the low end for sunk costs. However, once sunk costs reach 0.25 (or
approximately 26% of the value of the mean sized ﬁrm), the mean size of ﬁrms rises rapidly, while
the variance increases though somewhat non-monotonically. The entry barrier discourages new
ﬁrms reducing the mass of small ﬁrms. Markets become more concentrated with fewer ﬁrms, but
of greater average size. Thus, industries with high levels of sunk entry costs will exhibit greater
a v e r a g es i z eo fﬁrms, higher variance in the size, but a ﬂatter distribution potentially with multiple
modes.
Higher sunk costs have oﬀsetting eﬀects for incumbents which increases the variance but con-
tinues to reduce skewness and kurtosis. With smaller ﬁrms less likely to enter and pose a threat to
incumbents, ﬁrms have less competition reducing the beneﬁts of engaging in R&D which ﬂattens
the far end of the right-tail. However, at the same time, among incumbents, because the sunk
costs help extend the expected lifetime of any one ﬁrm, competition in terms of R&D intensiﬁes.
Thus, once a ﬁrm does enter it has strong incentives to try to develop a technological lead over
its rivals. This incentive leads to an increase in the mass of ﬁrms in the mid-sized range. Once a
suﬃcient cost advantage has been established the ﬁrst eﬀect comes to dominate and discourages
ﬁrms from establishing an even larger technological lead because the threat of entry has been
reduced.
26The model thus suggests that industries with large sunk costs should have a larger mean size,
greater variance and a ﬂatter distribution overall. The ﬂatter distribution and Figures 6c and
6d suggest that bi- or multi-model distributions are quite likely for industries characterized by
high sunk entry costs. The sunk entry costs protect incumbents such that once a ﬁrm reaches a
suﬃciently large size, it seeks to maintain that size by investing in R&D to maintain its advantage
but with less incentive to increase that advantage.
Audretsch et. al. (2004) argue that the service sector is more likely to approximate the strong
form of Gibrat’s Law and therefore the lognormal distribution because the link between ﬁrm size
and survival rates is weaker in industries with lower sunk costs and where capital intensity and
scale economies play less of a role.25 In our analysis, we ﬁnd that to be true particularly for the
ﬁxed costs which imply a higher requirement for scale in order for net proﬁts to be non-negative.
We also ﬁnd that the distribution more closely approximates the log-normal distribution at the
low end of the sunk costs.
5.3 Rate of Cost Reduction
The rate of cost reduction is captured by the parameter η. More speciﬁcally, η,w h i c hﬁrst
appears in (8), is the percentage decline in marginal costs of production conditional on a successful
innovation. Thus increases in η will translate into a faster industry growth rate for the same level
of investment as measured by output of the ﬁnal good. We think of η as a key parameter in
governing the rate of technological progress which in the context of the model is the rate at which
costs fall.
The parameter ranges from 0.07 to 0.20 with our baseline value set to 0.1 (10%), but to
make better sense out of this speciﬁcation, we convert it to the expected cost reduction at the
mean level of investment. At the low end, few ﬁrms are actually engaged in R&D and thus the
mean expected rate of cost reduction is only 0.32%, an anemically growing industry with little
25 Audretsch et al (2004) study the Dutch hospitality sector.
27innovation. However, at the upper bound, there is a fair amount of R&D and the mean rate rises
to 12.13%.26
Looking at Figures 7a-7d, we see that increases in the rate of technological progress lead to an
increase in both the mean and variance of the ﬁrm size distribution. The higher levels of cost
reduction lead to greater incentives to engage in R&D and capture market share from rivals which
leads to increases in both of the ﬁrst two moments. At the same time, variation in the rate
of technological progress has non-monotonic eﬀects on both the skewness and the kurtosis.B o t h
exhibit convexity as η rises. Skewness falls initially because at low levels of cost reduction, there is
a very small percentage of extremely large ﬁrms. These are ﬁrms that established a technological
advantage and raced ahead to cement their leading position. With increases in the rate of cost
reduction and, therefore, greater incentives for small and medium sized ﬁrms to use R&D, the
scope for business stealing rises. As a result the industry becomes more competitive leading to
more ﬁrms and more competition with fewer truly giant ﬁrms which reduces the overall skewness.
As the rate of cost reduction increases, around η =0 .15 or a mean expected cost reduction
of 7.1%, the skewness begins to increase as a larger mass of ﬁrms emerges in the mid-sized range
as can been seen in Figures 7c and 7d. Kurtosis undergoes a similar change. In fact, the
whole distribution almost completely ﬂattens out at our extremely high range. This eﬀect occurs
because the range of relative marginal costs throughout the incumbent ﬁrms increases along with
the strong incentives to engage in R&D to defend existing market share as well as capture market
share from rivals. Thus, rapid growth should lead to a high variance and a ﬂatter distribution.
This leads to the hypothesis that industries with high rates of technological progress are more likely
than those with low rates to exhibit multi-modal distributions.
Machado and Mata (2000) also measure empirically the marginal eﬀects of industry growth
26 Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) report industry growth rates for highly aggregated industries with the fastest
growing industry, eletronic and electric equipment, growing at an annual rate of 5.457% from 1958 to 1996. That
would suggest an upper bound for η of approximately 0.14 or 0.15. However, since that growth rate is for an
industry at roughly the 2-digit SIC level, it therefore averages across more detailed sectors. Thus, we examine the
eﬀects for even faster rates of growth.
28rates on the ﬁrm size distribution in their paper. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms in faster growing industries
have a higher mean, but more rapid growth reduces the skewness. For kurtosis they also ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.4 Technological Opportunity
The productivity of R&D which we think of as the technological opportunity facing an industry
is captured by a in equation (12). It is related to the rate of cost reduction, η, in the sense that
those two parameters jointly aﬀect the equilibrium rate of cost reduction. a governs the incentives
to engage in R&D and η deﬁnes the gains of success in terms of cost reduction. Higher levels of
a imply a higher probability of success for any given level of R&D expenditure. However, the
marginal impact of an increase in R&D expenditure falls with higher levels of a.M o r e o v e r , t h e
solution for the optimal level of investment based on the ﬁrst-order condition of the value function
shown in (16) implies that changes in a will have countervailing eﬀects. Thus, as a prior, we
expect to ﬁnd non-monotonic behavior as a varies.
The range of a that we used went from 2 to 4, centered around the baseline value of 3. At both
the lower and upper limits the computational algorithm began to generate extreme results. At
the lower level, we found that virtually no ﬁrms were investing in R&D while at the upper bound
ﬁrms began to exceed the limitations of the state space. To provide some economic interpretation
of these values, a ﬁrm investing at the average level from the baseline, would expect success in
R&D with a probability of 20.7% and thus an expected cost reduction by the following period of
2.07%. At the lower bound of a, 2, those values fall to less than 10% and under 1% while at the
upper bound they are slightly less than double the baseline.
Figures 8a through 8d show the eﬀect of varying a. Both the mean and variance of ﬁrm sizes
rise with productivity of R&D. In natural logs the pattern is similar, but there is some concavity
at the higher levels of a with respect to the variance. Increases in the productivity of R&D have
non-monotonic eﬀects on both the skewness and the kurtosis. Skewness and kurtosis both exhibit
29concavity, which contrasts with the results for the rate of cost reduction. The diﬀerence between
these two parameters appears to come from the left-side of the distribution and their eﬀects on
smaller ﬁrms. Changes in the productivity parameter aﬀect the right-tail of the distribution in
much the same way as an increases in the rate of cost reduction. In both we observe a steady
increase in the mass of ﬁrms to the right of the peak while the peak itself shrinks which eventually
lowers the skewness and the kurtosis. In natural logs the pattern is similar with, again, another
mode emerging on the right.
At very low levels for a, we found that the right-tail was much shorter and thinner than for the
higher values. This follows from the much lower productivity in R&D which stunts the incentive
to engage in R&D and the mean size of ﬁrms is considerably smaller as a result. Thus, at the
lowest levels of a, as R&D expenditures yield greater returns with the higher marginal product,
larger ﬁrms emerge and stretch the right-tail initially leading to increases in skewness and the
kurtosis. As a rises beyond 2.5, more ﬁrms engage in R&D leading to the increase in the variance
and hence a ﬂatter distribution overall with less skewness.
Of the structural parameters we investigate, this parameter is almost certainly the most diﬃcult
to capture empirically. However, we do wish to emphasize the strong non-monotonicity in this
variable and in the rate of cost reduction. The main conclusion we draw here is that empirically we
s h o u l dn o te x p e c tp r o x i e sf o re i t h e ra or η to have clear monotonic eﬀects on the higher moments
of the distribution and caution should be exercised in generalizing results found in studies of the
ﬁrm size distribution for a selected group of industries.
5.5 Rate of Spillovers
In the model, the parameter δ governs the rate at which the public stock of knowledge grows. The
faster it grows the easier it is for entrepreneurs drawing on the public stock to enter the industry
and challenge incumbents for market share. If δ =0 , it would imply that no knowledge enters
the public stock and over time no entrant would be able to challenge existing incumbents. At
30the other extreme, if δ =1then all new innovations enter the public stock in the following period
which would be similar to Klepper (2002) where all R&D is costlessly imitated.27
Mansﬁeld (1981) reports imitation times that range from about 6 months to nearly three
years. Thus, we allow δ to vary from 0.3 to 0.9 which generates an expected lifetime for a single
innovation to remain private from just over one year to more than three years. Low values of δ
can be interpreted as pertaining to an industry where incumbent ﬁrms possess strong advantages
through secrecy, patent protection, and/or lead time to implement their innovations.
Figures 9a through 9d show the results which are quite striking. Changes in the rate of
spillovers generate an enormous impact on both the mean and variance. Industries with stronger
patent protection (secrecy, or lead time) will have a higher mean and variance in the size of ﬁrms.
For example, at the low end of δ =0 .3 the mean ﬁrm size is nearly six times that of the baseline!
Intuitively the stronger the protection for private innovations, the greater their value to any one
ﬁrm. Therefore ﬁrms will accumulate a great number of private innovations and establish a large
presence in the market making it diﬃcult for any new entrant to mount a successful challenge.
However existing incumbents will compete ﬁercely in the R&D arena which contributes to both
the high mean and the large variance.
Looking at Figures 9c and 9d, we show the distributions when we move away from the baseline
of δ =0 .7 by ±0.2. The changes, particularly as δ falls, are more substantial here than for other
parameters examined. When δ is increased the peak mode becomes more pronounced with less
variance in ﬁrm sizes. Because private knowledge passes quickly from any ﬁrm to the public
stock, there is less ability and incentive for ﬁrms to engage heavily in R&D to separate themselves
from rivals. Firms in an industry with a high rate of spillovers are facing an uphill battle on a
slope that is nearly vertical.
At the low level of δ, the distribution has no obvious peak and shows great variation over the
27 In Klepper (2002), he assumes randomly assigned R&D productivities which allows for survival of the more
productive ﬁrms while generating high rates of exit during the product life cycle. Here we do not allow R&D
productivity to vary by ﬁrm but allow the innovations to diﬀuse slowly which generates the advantage of size
because large ﬁrms will hold more private innovations that smaller ﬁrms.
31mid-sized range. For the same distribution, a small, but noticeable mode emerges to the far right
(around 250 in levels and 5.6 in natural logs) which we do not see in other distributions. In fact
the distribution generated by the model fails to resemble the empirical distributions. Turning
to the higher moments there does not appear to be any straightforward eﬀect and no discernible
pattern. We draw no conclusions regarding the eﬀects on skewness and kurtosis here other than
to say they appear to be highly non-monotonic.
Based on the analysis here clearly the diﬀusion rate plays a critical role in shaping the ﬁrm
size distribution. While δ represents the rate at which knowledge becomes available to new ﬁrms,
it does not capture spillovers between incumbents. The extreme changes in the shape of the ﬁrm
size distribution that follow from modifying δ at levels that are empirically plausible, suggest that
our measure is simply too crude to capture all that secrecy and lead time entail. Extending the
framework to account for spillovers, imitation costs, and absorptive capacity between active ﬁrms
seems a highly fruitful avenue for further work.
6 Summary
Understanding the forces that generate diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution enables us to
identify the forces that generate more or less concentration across industries. This study provides
a model for undertaking this task. We show that the model replicates the characteristics of
the ﬁrm size distributions reported in the literature and reproduces the empirical growth-size
relationships. The model generates a substantial list of empirical hypotheses for testing the
eﬀect of various structural parameters on the ﬁrst four moments of ﬁrm size distributions. In
addition the model suggests that serial correlation in ﬁrm growth should weaken in empirical
studies if appropriate controls for R&D expenditure and innovations of existing and rival ﬁrms
are included.
It is worth emphasizing that the model is quite ﬂexible and can be adapted to serve as a
baseline for analyzing particular industries by matching the parameters and the moments of an
32observed industry level ﬁrm size distribution. With that baseline, counterfactual experiments
can be conducted and the eﬀects of policies on the ﬁrm size distribution can be analyzed, such as
subsidization of R&D or regulations that aﬀect barriers to entry.
We note some missing elements in our framework that could be incorporated in future work.
First, merger activity is one of the major concerns in the empirical literature (for example see
Kumar, 1985, and Dunne and Hughes, 1994). Our model can incorporate mergers by combining
it with Gowrisankaran’s (1999) extension to mergers of the Ericson-Pakes framework. Second,
the model here relies on stochastic R&D success and diﬀusion of knowledge to generate entry,
growth, survival, and exit. More could be done to capture other risks that entrepreneurs face
such as uncertainty of true costs as in Jovanovic (1982). That would enable an exploration of
how the rise of venture capital and lowering of entry barriers, other than the sunk costs discussed
here, aﬀect the ﬁrm size distribution.
We view the work presented here as a step forward in the interplay between the theory and
empirics of the ﬁrm size distribution. While the motivation for the theory comes from a host
of empirical observations, the theory provides us with a list of hypotheses that can be examined
empirically across industries. We would be surprised to ﬁnd that all of the hypotheses generated
apply to all industries and it is highly likely that the model may serve well for some industries
but not for others. That probable outcome would lead to both further reﬁnements of the model
and, we hope, a better understanding of the forces that shape the ﬁrm size distributions across
industries and their consequences.
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35TABLE 1: Baseline parameter values for simulations.
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount Rate facing ﬁrms 1/(1 + r) 1/1.08
Rate of Technological Spillover δ 0.7
Productivity of R&D Investment a 3
Sunk Entry Costs Xe 0.2
Cost per unit of R&D Spending c 1
Fixed Costs f 0.2
Liquidation Value φ 0.1
Outside Alternative Value ψ 0.2
Rate of Decrease in Marginal Costs η 0.10
Smallest Submarket Market Share θ1 0.136
Increments in Submarket Size b 0.0318
Unit Cost of Labor Z 131.12
TABLE 2: Distribution Statistics for Baseline (Natural Logs)
Normal H&O Model H&O Model H&O Model
Measure Distribution Emp. Emp. Sales Sales Net Assets Net Assets
Mean - 3.1582 3.1582 7.2015 5.1321 5.5539 4.9010
Std. Dev. - 1.5197 0.2803 1.6628 0.3697 1.9635 2.1468
Skewness 0 0.7487 -0.1114 0.1932 -1.0220 0.4366 0.7825
Kurtosis 3 4.5794 4.7265 6.1876 11.7373 4.835 2.9123
Note: H&O refers to the results reported in Hart and Oulton (1996).
TABLE 3: Distribution Statistics for Baseline Excluding Firms with <1 Employee (Natural Logs)
Normal H&O Model H&O Model H&O Model
Measure Distribution Emp. Emp. Sales Sales Net Assets Net Assets
Mean - 3.1582 3.1582 5.1825 5.1321 5.5539 4.8469
Std. Dev. - 1.5197 0.2718 1.6628 0.3516 1.9635 2.1499
Skewness 0 0.7487 0.0777 0.1932 -0.5251 0.4366 0.77770
Kurtosis 3 4.5794 3.9254 6.1876 5.6798 4.835 2.9031
TABLE 4: Average Summary Statistics in Natural Logs
Size Measure Employment Sales Net Assets
Observations 69.5 69.5 69.5
Average 3.521 5.027 5.189
Std. Dev. 0.521 0.493 1.410
Skewness 0.867 -0.402 0.717
Kurtosis 4.183 3.819 2.714
1TABLE 5: Regression Results
Firms Size Measure Average
Coeﬃcient
H0 : β =1
Rejection Rate
10% level 5% 1%
All Employment 0.971 100% 90% 80%
Sales 0.966 100% 100% 100%
Net Assets 0.944 100% 100% 100%
Large Employment 0.998 10% 0% 0%
Sales 0.979 100% 90% 80%
Net Assets 0.970 70% 70% 50%
Small Employment 0.929 100% 100% 90%
Sales 0.947 100% 100% 90%
Net Assets 0.883 100% 100% 100%
Average Diﬀerence
H0 : βLARGE = βSMALL
Rejection Rate
10% level 5% 1%
Equality Employment 0.069 100% 100% 80%
Sales 0.019 60% 60% 20%
Net Assets 0.061 90% 90% 70%
TABLE 6: Tests of Standard Deviation of Growth Rates by Size Class
Size Measure Total Large Small
H0 : σ1 = σ2
Rejection Rate
10% level 5% 1%
Employment 0.301 0.159 0.361 80% 80% 70%
Sales 0.321 0.195 0.401 70% 70% 70%
Net Assets 0.542 0.438 0.584 50% 50% 30%
2Figure 1:  US Firm Size Distribution by Employment, 2002
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Less than 1FIGURE 5a:  Fixed Cost Effects (Levels)
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
FIGURE  5b:  Fixed Cost Effects (Logs)
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fc=0.025 fc=0.25 BaselineFIGURE 6a:  Sunk Cost Effects (Levels)
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
FIGURE  6b:  Sunk Cost Effects (Logs)
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xe=0.1 xe=0.45 BaselineFIGURE 7a:  The Rate of Cost Reduction Effects (Levels)
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
FIGURE  7b:  The Rate of Cost Reduction Effects (Logs)








0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2








































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2











































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2











































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2










































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2









































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2












































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2















































0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2






























































































































eta=0.07 Baseline eta=0.15FIGURE 8a:  Technological Opportunity Effects (Levels)
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
FIGURE  8b:  Technological Opportunity Effects (Logs)
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a=2.0 a=4.0 BaselineFIGURE 9a:  The Rate of Technological Spillovers Effects (Levels)
Percentage Deviations from Baseline Values of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
FIGURE  9b:  The Rate of Technological Spillovers Effects (Logs)
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FIGURE 9d:  Effects of the Rate of Spillovers on Firm Size Distribution (Logs)
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